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Abstract. Properties of classical (logical) entailment relation (denoted
as ⊢) have been well studied and well-understood, either with or without
the presence of logical connectives.
There is, however, less uniform agreement on laws for the nonmonotonic
consequence relation. This paper studies axioms for nonmonotonic con-
sequences from a semantics-based point of view, focusing on a class of
mathematical structures for reasoning about partial information without
a predefined syntax/logic. This structure is called a default structure. We
study axioms for the nonmonotonic consequence relation derived from
extensions as in Reiter’s default logic, using skeptical reasoning, but ex-
tensions are now used for the construction of possible worlds in a default
information structure.
In previous work we showed that skeptical reasoning arising from default-
extensions obeys a well-behaved set of axioms including the axiom of cau-
tious cut. We show here that, remarkably, the converse is also true: any
consequence relation obeying this set of axioms can be represented as one
constructed from skeptical reasoning. We provide representation theo-
rems to relate axioms for nonmonotonic consequence relation and proper-
ties about extensions, and provide a one-to-one correspondence between
nonmonotonic systems which satisfies the law of cautious monotony and
default structures with unique extensions. Our results give a theoretical
justification for a set of basic rules governing the update of nonmono-
tonic knowledge bases, demonstrating the derivation of them from the
more concrete and primitive construction of extensions. It is also striking
to note that proofs of the representation theorems show that only shal-
low extensions are necessary, in the sense that the number of iterations
needed to achieve an extension is at most three. All of these develop-
ments are made possible by taking a more liberal view of consistency:
consistency is a user defined predicate, satisfying some basic properties.
⋆ Originally published in proc. PCL 2002, a FLoC workshop; eds. Hendrik Decker, Dina
Goldin, Jørgen Villadsen, Toshiharu Waragai (http://floc02.diku.dk/PCL/).
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Introduction
Reasoning in general is concerned with drawing conclusions from a set of premises.
Mathematical reasoning is monotonic, in the sense that if the set of premises
becomes bigger, the set of conclusions also grows larger (or stays the same).
Reasoning in daily life, however, is nonmonotonic, because conclusions drawn
earlier due to the lack of information may have to be withdrawn later in light
of new information. This nonmonotonic phenomenon can be avoided by putting
time-stamps on conclusions. Thus, the conclusions drawn earlier and the con-
clusions withdrawn later have different time-stamps and are treated as different
conclusions. The cost of this temporal approach, which will not be discussed
further here, is the “frame problem”, referring to the issue of keeping track of
much of background information that stays unchanged as time goes on.
Nonmonotonicity arises when explicit time-stamps are avoided when we are
in fact dealing with time-sensitive, partial information. For example, in databases
data are not time-stamped, but they evolve continuously over time.
A well-known formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning is Reiter’s default logic
[18], in which the so-called extension construction was introduced as a important
method to extend current knowledge using default rules. Reiter’s treatment is
syntactic, in the sense that default rules are used as extended proof rules for first
order logic, allowing more conclusions derived provided that the global property
of consistency is not violated. It should be of no surprise that this treatment has
caused some anomalies, because first order logic was invented for mathematical
reasoning rather than commonsense reasoning.
There is a conceptually cleaner view of default reasoning under the paradigm
of modal logic with Kripke structure as models [26]. We can think of a state in a
Kripke structure as a state of knowledge/information. Possible worlds represent
hypothetical worlds which may evolve from a given state. Modal logic can then
be adapted for the purpose of reasoning about belief. The role of default is now
relegated to the semantic structure as a concrete way for constructing possible
worlds using extensions. Nonmonotonic reasoning in this new setting becomes
model-checking: given a state (a knowledge base) in the Kripke structure and a
belief formula (expressed in modal logic), determine whether or not the belief is
supported. Nonmonotonicity corresponds to the fact that a belief supported in
the current state may become unsupported in a possible future state.
This semantic view of default reasoning is developed in detail in the so-called
default domain theory [19]. The idea is to use Scott’s information system [21] as
the basic semantic structure for representing information states (the underlying
Kripke structure), extended with default rules in order to construct possible
worlds. Here are some specific achievements of default domain theory.
– Power default reasoning. Domain theory is a powerful and elegant framework
developed by Scott and others for the denotational semantics of program-
ming languages. A routine practice in domain theory is that an object of
one type can be embedded/projected to different type in order to facilitate
a more appropriate treatment. The idea of power default reasoning [29] is to
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encode default rules in a higher-order setting so that a nonmonotonic oper-
ator at the base level induces a better behaved operator in the higher-order
space of Smyth powerdomain. Under power default reasoning, the extension
construction has nice structural properties. For example, one can show a
dichotomy theorem [29] which states that with respect to a set of default
constraints on a Scott domain D lifted as power defaults Γ on the Smyth
powerdomain P(D), an element either has a safe, unique Γ -extension, or
else the multiple Γ -extensions will all be singleton generated. The Extension
Splitting Theorem [29] states that any extension of the union of two com-
pact open sets can be split into the union of two corresponding extensions.
This allowed us to prove, among other things, the law of reasoning by cases
and the law of cautious monotony, as discussed in [12]. Note that the cases
law and cautious monotony law do not hold for standard propositional de-
fault logic, which is among the anomalies of default logic discussed in the
literature.
– Complexity. These structural properties have direct algorithmic consequences.
Based on the Dichotomy Theorem, an algorithm [28] has been developed for
skeptical normal default inference in propositional logic to show that the
problem is complete for co-NP(3), the third level of the Boolean hierarchy.
This contrasts favorably with standard propositional default reasoning based
on default logic, which was proved to be ΠP2 -complete [10,4].
– Semantics of disjunctive logic programming. Our domain-theoretic investi-
gation to logic programming started with the basic observation that the
information system representation of domains [21] bears a remarkable simi-
larity to the syntax of definite logic programs (the so-called Horn clauses).
Our work [20] shows that a general disjunctive logic programming paradigm
can be developed on coherent domains – algebraic cpos on which the in-
tersection of any two compact open sets remains compact open. From the
domain-theoretic point of view, these are very general spaces which contain
several prominent categories already (such as Scott domains and SFP do-
mains). More concretely, a disjunctive logic program can be regarded as a
sequent structure. Such a structure generates spatial locales (the so-called
pointless topology [11]), which provide models and proof rules for which
completeness is guaranteed [3].
In this paper we continue the semantics-based study of nonmonotonic in-
ference by providing representation theorems for the skeptical nonmonotonic
consequence relation. We show that an abstract nonmonotonic relation satisfies
the law of cautious monotony (among other reasonable axioms) if and only if it
can be generated from a set of normal default rules with unique extensions. We
then provide some preliminary discussions on a possible categorical setting in
which to discuss properties of these constructions. These developments are made
possible by taking a less restricted view of consistency: we view consistency as a
user defined predicate, satisfying some basic properties, as precisely captured by
information systems – Con. There is no prescribed global notion of consistency;
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a set of tokens can be consistent in one information system while inconsistent
in another. We believe that the meaning for “paraconsistency” ultimately lies in
this local, user-defined interpretation.
Related work. The idea of extension was introduced by Reiter [18]. Makin-
son [13] and others [9] have provided extensive study of many axioms discussed
here, sometimes from the belief-revision point of view. Marek, Nerode, and Rem-
mel [14] have studied structures similar to default information structures, from
a recursion-theoretic point of view. The first representation result similar to the
ones studied here was given in [27]. Hitzler and Seda [22,23], in a sequence of
papers, studied logic programming semantics using the tools of Topology and
Analysis. The edited volume [25] contains a number of discussions on the role of
partiality of information for commonsense reasoning. These are philosophically
allied to our domain-theoretic approach to logic programming and nonmonotonic
reasoning. Fitting [5,6,7] was among the first ones to introduce order to the study
of logic programming in a systematic way. There are also other kinds of repre-
sentation results in the literature. For example, Marek, Treur, and Truszczynski
[15] studied the problem of when a family of theories can be represented as the
extension family of normal defaults. Our work differs from this in that we relate
default theory to axioms for the nonmonotonic consequence relation, establishing
connections between two independent paradigms.
1 Default domain theory
This section provides an overview of the basic structure of default domain the-
ory – default information structures. We refer to [21,30] for more discussion on
information systems, and [1,2,16] for background on nonmonotonic reasoning.
1.1 Information systems
In order to study the properties of nonmonotonic systems, let’s first take a look
at monotonic systems, as captured in Scott’s information systems.
An information system consists of a set A of tokens, a subset Con of the
set of finite subsets of A, denoted as Fin(A), and a relation ⊢ between Con
and A. The subset Con on A is often called the consistency predicate, and the
relation ⊢ is called the entailment relation. Both the consistency predicate and
the entailment relation satisfy some axioms due to Tarski, made precise in the
following definition.
Definition 1. An information system A is a triple (A,Con,⊢), where
1. A is the token set,
2. Con is the consistency predicate (Con ⊆ Fin(A) and ∅ ∈ Con),
3. ⊢ is the entailment relation (⊢ ⊆ Con×A).
Moreover, the consistency predicate and entailment relation satisfy the following
properties:
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1. X ⊆ Y & Y ∈ Con⇒ X ∈ Con,
2. a ∈ A⇒ { a } ∈ Con,
3. X ⊢ a & X ∈ Con⇒ X ∪ { a } ∈ Con,
4. a ∈ X & X ∈ Con⇒ X ⊢ a,
5. (∀b ∈ Y X ⊢ b) & Y ⊢ c⇒ X ⊢ c.
Although monotonicity for ⊢ is not explicitly given, it is a derivable property.
Suppose Y ⊢ a and Y ⊆ X with X ∈ Con. By (4), X ⊢ b for every b ∈ Y . Now
apply (5) and we get X ⊢ a. Thus monotonicity is an inherent property of ⊢:
Y ⊢ a & Y ⊆ X ⇒ X ⊢ a.1
The notion of consistency can be easily extended to arbitrary token sets
by enforcing compactness, i.e., a set is consistent if every finite subset of it is
consistent. By overloading notation, we write X ∈ Con when every finite subset
of X is consistent.
The monotonicity of ⊢ induces a monotonic operator F : Con→ Con for an
information system (A,Con,⊢): F (X) := {a | ∃Y (Y ⊆fin X & Y ⊢ a)}. (Here,
⊆fin stands for “finite subset of”.) One can show, by property (3) of ⊢, that
F (X) is consistent if X is (so F is a well-defined function).
The reflexivity property (4) implies that F is inflationary, in the sense that
X ⊆ F (X) for any X ⊆ A. The continuity of F follows from the finiteness (or
compactness) of ⊢ on its left-hand-side.
From these we can easily show that for any given subset X of tokens, F has
a least fixed-point containing X . F is in fact a closure operator (often denoted
as Cn in the literature), with the following defining properties:
– Inflationary: X ⊆ F (X);
– Monotone: X ⊆ Y ⇒ F (X) ⊆ F (Y );
– Idempotent: F (F (X)) = F (X).
Idempotency of F follows from the transitivity (5) of ⊢. To show the non-
trivial containment F (F (X)) ⊆ F (X), let a ∈ F (F (X)). This means that for
some finite Y ⊆ F (X), Y ⊢ a. But for each b ∈ Y , there is some finite Xb ⊆ X
such that Xb ⊢ b. In fact, the finite subset
⋃
{Xb | b ∈ Y } of X entails every
token in Y , by monotonicity. Now the transitivity of ⊢ gives
⋃
{Xb | b ∈ Y } ⊢ a
and so a ∈ F (X), as required.
The information states of an information system are precisely sets of the
form F (X) with X ∈ Con, where Con is understood in the generalized sense to
include infinite sets through the compactness condition. Moreover, the set of all
information state {F (X) | X ∈ Con} is precisely the set of fixed-points of F .
The importance of information systems lies in the fact that they provide a
concrete representation of Scott domains2.
1 Here we deliberately dropped the X ∈ Con condition. One can, as in logic, define
Con in such a way that X ∈ Con if and only if X 6⊢ a for some a ∈ A, as suggested
by Peter Aczel in a personal communication. However, this “logical” definition is
more limited, in that it insists on the whole set A to be inconsistent.
2 Exactly what a Scott domain is need not concern us here. It should suffice to say
that a Scott domain is a complete lattice with the top element removed.
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Theorem 1. (Scott) For any information system A, the collection of its infor-
mation states |A| under inclusion forms a Scott domain. Conversely, every Scott
domain is order-isomorphic to the partial order of information states of some
information system.
1.2 Normal default structures
We now introduce the main definitions of default domain theory. Normal default
structures are information systems extended with a set of default rules of the
form
X : a
a
, with X a finite consistent set, and a a single token of the underlying
information system. The idea of a default rule is that one can generate models
(states of belief) by finding X as a subset of tokens in a state under construction,
checking that a is consistent with the current state, and then adding the token
a.
Definition 2. A normal default structure is a tuple A = (A, Con, ∆, ⊢) where
(A,Con,⊢) is an information system, ∆ is a set of normal defaults, each element
of which is written as
X : a
a
, with X ∈ Con, a ∈ A. If each default is of the form
∅ : a
a
, we call the default structure precondition free.
Extensions are a key notion related to a default structure. An extension of an
information state x is intuitively an information state y extending x, constructed
in such a way that everything in y reflects an agent’s belief expressed by defaults.
If the current situation is x, then because it is a partial model, it may not contain
enough information to settle an issue (either positively or negatively). Extensions
of x are partial models containing at least as much information as x, but the
extra information in an extension is only plausible, not factual.
The following definition is just a reformulation, in information-theoretic terms,
of Reiter’s own notion of extension in default logic.
Definition 3. Let A = (A,Con, ∆,⊢) be a default structure, and x an informa-
tion state of the information system (A,Con,⊢). For any S ⊆ A, define Φ(x, S)
to be the union
⋃
i≥0 φ(x, S, i), where (note that F is given in the previous sub-
section)
φ(x, S, 0) = x,
φ(x, S, i + 1) = F (φ(x, S, i)) ∪
{a |
X : a
a
∈ ∆ & X ⊆ φ(x, S, i) & {a} ∪ S ∈ Con}.
Call y an extension of x if Φ(x, y) = y. In this case we also write x ǫA y, with
the subscript omitted when the default structure under consideration is clear.
Basic properties of extensions are stated next, which will be used in the proof
of main representation theorems in the next section. These properties are parallel
to those for Reiter’s default logic, and so their proofs are omitted.
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Theorem 2. Let A = (A,Con, ∆,⊢) be a normal default structure, and x, y
information states of the information system (A,Con,⊢). We have
1. x has at least one extension.
2. if x ǫ y then y ⊇ x.
3. if x ǫ y, then y ǫ z if and only if y = z for any information state z.
4. for any information state z, if x ǫ y and x ǫ z, then either y = z or y∪z 6∈ Con.
In terms of possible world semantics, normal default structures give rise to
Kripke structures in which every state has either a transition to a different state
or loops to itself. Moreover, if a state does contain a transition to a new state,
then such future states are pairwise incompatible (there is no common future
states).
2 Axioms for nonmonotonic consequence
There is little disagreement about what properties should a (monotonic) entail-
ment relation have: these were given by Tarski, as captured in information sys-
tems. The situation is quite different for the nonmonotonic consequence relation.
To motivate the discussion, we first take a look at the skeptical nonmonotonic
consequence relation determined by a normal default information structure with a
trivial ⊢. The default structures will have only three components, as (A,Con, ∆),
with ⊢ understood as X ⊢ a if and only if a ∈ X . The closure operator F will
now be the identity function: F (X) = X .
Definition 4. The skeptical nonmonotonic consequence relation |∼A with re-
spect to a normal default structure (A,Con, ∆) is defined as X |∼A a if a belongs
to every extension y of X. Here X is a finite consistent subset of A, and a ∈ A.
Since extensions exist in normal default structures, we have
X |∼A a⇐⇒ a ∈
⋂
{y | XǫAy}.
The next example shows that |∼A is not monotonic: X |∼A a and X ⊆ Y
does not imply Y |∼ a.
Example 1. Consider the default structure (A,Con, ∆) with A := {a, b}, ∆ :=
{
∅ : b
b
}, and {a, b} 6∈ Con.
There is a unique extension for ∅: {b}. There is only one extension for {a} as
well: {a} itself. The conflict with b prevents us from adding b to {a}. We have
∅ |∼ b, but {a} 6|∼ b.
Failing monotonicity, what other properties can we say about |∼A? For sake
of brevity, we write, for finite sets X and Y , X |∼ Y to mean that X |∼ b for
every b ∈ Y . Certainly we have X |∼ X for every consistent finite set X . The
only non-trivial property we can say about |∼ in general seems to be cautious
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cut: X |∼ T & T,X |∼ Y ⇒ X |∼ Y.We call it cautious cut because the standard
cut axiom takes the following form:
X |∼ T & T, Y |∼ Z ⇒ X,Y |∼ Z.
This is equivalent to cautious cut when monotonicity is assumed, but cut is
stronger in the nonmonotonic case.
We need the following property to prove cautious cut.
Lemma 1. For any finite consistent sets P,Q of a default structure (A,Con, ∆),
if P ǫR and Q ⊆ R, then (P ∪Q) ǫR.
A proof for this can be found in [27].
Theorem 3. Let (A,Con, ∆) be a normal default structure. The derived skep-
tical nonmonotonic relation |∼A satisfies cautious cut.
Proof. Let X |∼A T and T,X |∼A Y for finite consistent sets X,T, Y . We have
T ⊆
⋂
{e | XǫAe} and Y ⊆
⋂
{e | (X ∪ T )ǫAe}.
We need to show that Y ⊆
⋂
{e | XǫAe}. Let e be an extension of X . We
have T ⊆ e since X |∼A T . By Lemma 1, e is an extension of X ∪ T . However,
Y is a subset of every extension of X ∪ T ; in particular, Y ⊆ e. Therefore, Y is
a subset of every extension of X , as required for X |∼A Y .
✷
We take the properties satisfied by |∼A as the minimal set of properties that
any nonmonotonic consequence relation should satisfy. This brings us to the
notion of abstract nonmonotonic system.
Definition 5. An abstract nonmonotonic system is a triple (A,Con, |∼), where
Con is a collection of finite subsets X of A, called the consistent sets, |∼ is
a subset of Con × Con, called the relation of nonmonotonic entailment, which
satisfies the following axioms:
1. X ⊆ Y ∈ Con⇒ X ∈ Con,
2. a ∈ A⇒ {a} ∈ Con,
3. X |∼ T ⇒ X ∪ T ∈ Con,
4. Y ⊆ X ⇒ X |∼ Y,
5. X |∼ T & T,X |∼ Y ⇒ X |∼ Y,
6. X |∼ Y & X |∼ Z ⇒ X |∼ Y ∪ Z.
Note that Axiom 4 is reflexivity, and Axiom 5 is cautious cut. The rest of the
properties are routine. Axioms 4 and 6 together allow us to view a nonmonotonic
system as one generated from instances of the formX |∼ {a}. One can then define
X |∼ Y if and only if X |∼ {b} for every b ∈ Y . X |∼ ∅ is vacuously true.
Theorem 4 (Zhang and Rounds [27]). For any a normal default structure
(A,Con, ∆), (A,Con, |∼A) is an abstract nonmonotonic system, where the rela-
tion |∼A is given in Definition 4.
We will not go through the formality of the proof here, but only note that
cautious cut follows from Theorem 3, and Axiom 3 follows from the fact that
extensions always exist and each one of them is a consistent set.
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3 Representation theorems
Theorem 4 says that any normal default structure determines an abstract non-
monotonic system – a nonmonotonic relation satisfying a minimal set of prop-
erties including reflexivity and cautious cut.
The more interesting question is the converse: is it true that every abstract
nonmonotonic system can be represented concretely as one derived from a nor-
mal default structure? In other words, for each abstract nonmonotonic system
(A,Con, |∼), is there a normal default structure (B,Con, ∆) such that |∼ = |∼B?
We show that the converse of Theorem 4 is indeed true. Such a representa-
tion result bears much resemblance to the fundamental Cayley’s Theorem for
finite groups, saying that any finite group is isomorphic to a permutation group.
The next theorem says that every abstract nonmonotonic relation is determined
by some normal default structure. This shows that the framework of default
rules with extensions, although a concrete nonmonotonic formalism, is expres-
sive enough to represent any reasonable nonmonotonic consequence relation.
Theorem 5. Let (A,Con, |∼) be an abstract nonmonotonic system. There is a
normal default structure B = (B,Con∗, ∆) satisfying the following properties:
1. B ⊇ A,
2. for any X ⊆ B, X ∈ Con if and only if X ⊆ A and X ∈ Con∗,
3. for every X,Y ∈ Con, X |∼ Y if and only if X |∼B Y.
Conditions 2 states that Con∗ is a conservative extension of Con, and condi-
tion 3 says that |∼B is a conservative extension of |∼.
Example 2. An example will be helpful to illustrate the idea of the proof. Con-
sider the abstract nonmonotonic system (A,Con, |∼) with A = {a, b}, Con = 2A
and |∼ generated by requiring ∅ |∼ {a} and ∅ |∼ {b} (i.e., reflexivity and cautious
cut is always assumed; note that we have neither {a} |∼ {b}, nor {b} |∼ {a}). We
would like to construct a default structure B = (B,Con∗, ∆) which determines
this nonmonotonic entailment relation3.
The idea is to introduce, for each consistent set X , a new token [X ], similar
to the powerset construction in automata theory. Thus we have a total of 4 new
tokens: [∅], [{a}], [{b}], [{a, b}].
For each new token [X ], we introduce a default rule
X : [X ]
[X ]
as well as a set
of default rules {
{[X ]} : a
a
| X |∼ a & a 6∈ X}. For the example at hand, we have
the following default rules:
∅ : [∅]
[∅]
,
{[∅]} : a
a
,
{[∅]} : b
b
,
{a} : [{a}]
[{a}]
,
{b} : [{b}]
[{b}]
,
{a, b} : [{a, b}]
[{a, b}]
.
3 This example also explains why we cannot in general require B = A in Theorem 5.
Here, if we only used tokens a and b, then for any default structure giving rise to
∅ |∼ {a} and ∅ |∼ {b}, we would also have had {a} |∼ {b} – try it!
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The consistency predicate Con∗ is defined in such a way that it extends Con,
but new tokens are inconsistent with each other. Moreover, for a set containing
a new token [X ] to be consistent, every other element in the set must be a
nonmonotonic consequence of X . Therefore, the consistent sets in Con∗ are sets
(as well as their subsets) of the form Y ∪ {[X ]} with X,Y ⊆ {a, b}, X |∼ Y . For
instance, {[∅], [{a}]} and {[{a}], b} are inconsistent sets.
We have ∅ |∼B {a} and ∅ |∼B {b}, because the unique extension for ∅ is
{[∅], a, b}.
But we do not have {b} |∼B {a}, since there are two extensions for {b}:
{b, [{b}]} and {a, b, [∅]},
and a is not in the first extension. Similarly, we do not have {a} |∼B {b} either.
We now describe a general procedure to construct the required default struc-
ture B = (B,Con∗, ∆) from an abstract nonmonotonic system (A,Con, |∼).
The token set B is A∪{[X ] | X ∈ Con}. The idea is to introduce a new token
for each consistent set X and use sets of given tokens to encode new tokens. Note
that we need only introduce [X ] for (consistent) finite sets X in the powerset of
A here, even though A may be infinite.
We have two kinds of default rules. One is
X : [X ]
[X ]
for each X ∈ Con, and
the other is
{[X ]} : a
a
for each nonmonotonic instance X |∼ a with a 6∈ X . Thus
∆ := {
X : [X ]
[X ]
| X ∈ Con} ∪ {
{[X ]} : a
a
| X |∼ a & a 6∈ X}.
For any subset W of B, W ∈ Con∗ if and only if all of the following three
conditions hold:
1. W ∩ A ∈ Con, i.e., the old tokens in W form a consistent set in Con;
2. at most one token of the form [X ] is in W ;
3. if [X ] ∈ W , then X |∼W \ {[X ]}.
It is straightforward to check that the consistency predicate defined this way
has the required properties. Each individual token is indeed consistent. For any
subset Z of W ∈ Con∗, we have Z ∈ Con∗ by examining the three conditions
above.
The remaining task is to show that the default structure B has the properties
as stated in Theorem 5. This will be achieved in several lemmas.
An auxiliary notation is needed. We define X˜ := {t | X |∼ {t}}, i.e., X˜ is the
set of all nonmonotonic consequences of X .
Lemma 2. Let (A,Con, |∼) be an abstract nonmonotonic system. We have, for
any consistent set X, ⋂
{Y˜ | Y ⊆ X ⊆ Y˜ } = X˜.
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Proof. We prove the non-trivial direction ⊇ by showing that if Y ⊆ X ⊆ Y˜
then X˜ ⊆ Y˜ . Suppose Y ⊆ X ⊆ Y˜ . Given any a in X˜ , we can rewrite this as
X \ Y, Y |∼ a since Y is a subset of X . Further more, since X ⊆ Y˜ , we have
Y |∼ X \ Y. Now, applying cautious cut we get Y |∼ {a}. Therefore a ∈ Y˜ .
✷
The axiomatization of the nonmonotonic operator (˜ ) has been studied in
depth, notably by Makinson and others. Here we only indicate that it is not
monotonic (of course), and it is not necessarily true that
˜˜
X = X˜.
Lemma 3. Let P,Q be finite consistent sets in an abstract nonmonotonic sys-
tem (A,Con, |∼) and B = (B,Con∗, ∆) the corresponding default structure. If
Q ⊆ P ⊆ Q˜, then Q˜ ∪ {[Q]} is an extension of P in B.
Proof. It is easy to see that the set Q˜∪{[Q]} is consistent with respect to Con∗.
Let’s write ρ(Q) for Q˜ ∪ {[Q]}.
We need to verify the defining equality ρ(Q) =
⋃
i≥0 φ(P, ρ(Q), i). By defini-
tion,
φ(P, ρ(Q), 1) = P ∪ {a |
X : a
a
∈ ∆ & X ⊆ P & {a} ∪ ρ(Q) ∈ Con∗}.
The only applicable rules in ∆ are of the form
X : [X ]
[X ]
with X ⊆ P ; but only
Q : [Q]
[Q]
will meet the consistency requirement. Therefore, φ(P, ρ(Q), 1) = P ∪
{[Q]}.
The second iteration φ(P, ρ(Q), 2) is the set
(P ∪ {[Q]}) ∪ {a |
X : a
a
∈ ∆ & X ⊆ (P ∪ {[Q]}) & {a} ∪ ρ(Q) ∈ Con∗}.
This time all and only tokens in Q˜ \ Q gets added to φ(P, ρ(Q), 1), since the
applicable default rules are of the form
{[Q]} : b
b
with b ∈ Q˜ \Q. Therefore, we
obtain φ(P, ρ(Q), 2) = (P ∪ {[Q]}) ∪ Q˜ = ρ(Q), as needed.
✷
This proof conveys the additional information that extensions such as ρ(Q)
can be attained in two iterations. This offers an explanation of why default
reasoning need not be hard (see [24] as well), because deep iterations for building
extensions may not be needed.
Lemma 4. Let P be a finite consistent set in an abstract nonmonotonic system
(A,Con, |∼) and B = (B,Con∗, ∆) the corresponding default structure. Then
every extension of P in B is of the form Q˜ ∪ {[Q]}, with Q ⊆ P ⊆ Q˜.
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Proof. SupposeW is an extension of P . We haveW 6= P since otherwise
P : [P ]
[P ]
is applicable, forcing [P ] to be added to W .
By design (of ∆), the first token added to φ(P,W, 1) must be of the form
[Q], with Q ⊆ P . So φ(P,W, 1) = P ∪ {[Q]} for some Q ⊆ P . We show that
W = Q˜ ∪ {[Q]}.
The consistency constraint requires that P ⊆ Q˜. It also requires that no
other tokens of the form [X ] belong to W . So in the second iteration one can
(and must) apply all defaults of the form
{[Q]} : b
b
with b ∈ Q˜ \Q. This gives
φ(P,W, 2) = P ∪ {[Q]} ∪ (Q˜ \Q).
Since Q ⊆ P , we get W = Q˜ ∪ {[Q]}.
✷
Proof (Theorem 5). The first two items are obvious from the definition of B. We
show the third item: for every X,Y ∈ Con, X |∼ Y if and only if X |∼B Y.
Let X,Y be consistent subsets of A such that X |∼ Y . By Lemma 3 and
Lemma 4, extensions of X in B are precisely sets of the form Q˜ ∪ {[Q]} with
Q ⊆ X ⊆ Q˜. For any such Q, we have, by Lemma 2, X˜ ⊆ Q˜. Therefore Y ⊆ Q˜
and Y is a subset of every extension of X in B. This proves X |∼B Y.
Suppose, on the other hand, X |∼B Y for subsets X,Y of A. By Lemma 3
and Lemma 4, Y ⊆
⋂
{Q˜ ∪ {[Q]} | Q ⊆ X ⊆ Q˜}. Remembering that Y ⊆ A, we
see that Y ⊆
⋂
{Q˜ | Q ⊆ X ⊆ Q˜}. This means Y ⊆ X˜, by Lemma 2. Therefore,
X |∼ Y .
✷
4 Cautious monotony and unique extension
The axiom of cautious monotony, considered by Gabbay, Kraus, Lehmann, and
Magidor and others [8,12], takes the form
X |∼ {a} & X |∼ {b} ⇒ X ∪ {a} |∼ {b}.
(We will drop the { } for singletons and write X |∼ a & X |∼ b ⇒ X, a |
∼ b as well.) This axiom intuitively says that a nonmonotonic consequence can
always be added as a premise without affecting what was originally entailed.
It is arguably one of the most fundamental assumptions for a nonmonotonic
knowledge base to work: if your knowledge base X can support several beliefs,
say a, b, then you should be able to adjoin these beliefs to enlarge the knowledge
base to X∪{a, b}. Now, applying the reflexivity axiom – Axiom 4 of Definition 5,
we get X ∪ {a} |∼ b.
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An easy induction shows that cautious monotony is equivalent to the more
general form X |∼ Y & X |∼ Z ⇒ X,Y |∼ Z, with X,Y, Z being finite (con-
sistent) sets. If an abstract nonmonotonic system (A,Con, ∆) satisfies cautious
monotony, we will call it a cumulative nonmonotonic system.
Here is an example showing that the skeptical nonmonotonic consequence re-
lation derived from a generic default structure need not satisfy cautious monotony.
Example 3. Consider the default structure (A,Con, ∆) with
A = {a, b, c},
∆ = {
∅ : a
a
,
{a} : b
b
,
{b} : c
c
},
{a, b, c} 6∈ Con.
There is a unique extension for ∅: {a, b}. There are, however, two extensions
for {b}: {a, b} and {b, c}, both are maximal consistent sets. We have, therefore,
∅ |∼ b, ∅ |∼ a, but {b} 6|∼ a.
Intuitively, cautious monotony fails here because the added premise (such as b
here) may trigger the firing of a default rule (such as
{b} : c
c
here) not previously
applicable, leading to a different extension (such as {b, c}) which blocks a given
default rule (such as
∅ : a
a
). This prevents an existing consequence (such as a)
from being present in all extensions of the changed situation.
Cautious monotony, however, does hold when extensions are unique. The
reason is that in this case, a nonmonotonic consequence can be added without
changing the (unique) extension.
Theorem 6 (Zhang and Rounds [27]). Let (A,Con, ∆) be a normal default
structure such that extensions are unique for any information state. Then the
derived nonmonotonic consequence relation |∼A is cumulative, i.e., it satisfies
cautious monotony.
In the rest of the section we show (which is new) that the converse of the
above is also true, leading to another representation result.
Theorem 7. For any cumulative nonmonotonic system (A,Con, |∼), there ex-
ists a normal default structure B = (B,Con∗, ∆) with the following properties:
– B ⊇ A,
– for any X ⊆ B, we have X ∈ Con if and only if X ⊆ A and X ∈ Con∗,
– for every X,Y ∈ Con, it is the case that X |∼ Y if and only if X |∼B Y,
– there exists a unique extension for every information state of B.
Since any cumulative nonmonotonic system is an abstract nonmonotonic sys-
tem in the sense of Definition 5, Theorem 5 tells us that it can be represented
by a normal default structure. The point of Theorem 7 is that, we can require
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the normal default structure to have unique extensions, which the construction
given earlier for Theorem 5 does not provide4.
A lemma is needed to support the new construction.
Lemma 5. Let (A,Con, |∼) be a cumulative nonmonotonic system. For finite
consistent sets P,Q of A, if Q ⊆ P ⊆ Q˜, then P˜ = Q˜.
Proof. Lemma 2 gives P˜ ⊆ Q˜ and we need to show the other way round.
Suppose Q |∼ a. We need to show that P |∼ a. Since P ⊆ Q˜, we have Q |∼ P .
Applying cautious monotony to Q |∼ P and Q |∼ a, we get P ∪ Q |∼ a. This is
the same as P |∼ a since Q is a subset of P , by assumption.
✷
One can see from the proof of Theorem 5 that there is a 1-1 correspondence
among setsQs withQ ⊆ P ⊆ Q˜ and extensions of P , labeled by [Q]. The previous
lemma suggests that we should now collect all such [Q]s in one extension, with
the proviso that Q ⊆ P˜ and P˜ = Q˜.
This is in fact the key idea for the proof of Theorem 7. Let (A,Con, |∼)
be an abstract nonmonotonic system satisfying cautious monotony. Define B =
(B,Con∗, ∆), where
– B := A ∪ {[X ] | X ∈ Con},
– ∆ := {
X : [X ]
[X ]
| X ∈ Con} ∪ {
{[X ]} : a
a
| a ∈ X˜ \X},
– W ∈ Con∗ if and only if all of the following three conditions hold:
1. W ∩ A ∈ Con, i.e., the old tokens in W form a consistent set in Con;
2. for each pair [X ], [Y ] of (new) tokens in W , X˜ = Y˜ ;
3. if [X ] ∈ W , then X |∼W ∩ A.
Note that the difference from the previous construction is in the consistency
predicate Con∗. Two distinct tokens [X ], [Y ] need not to be in conflict, as long
as X˜ = Y˜ .
Theorem 7 is now an immediate consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let B = (B,Con∗, ∆) be the normal default structure for a cumula-
tive nonmonotonic system (A,Con, |∼) (as given in the procedure above). Every
finite consistent set P ⊆ A has a unique extension, which is
δ(P ) := P˜ ∪ {[Q] | Q ⊆ P˜ & Q˜ = P˜}.
Proof. As a sanity check, we see that δ(P ) is indeed consistent. Suppose W is
an extension of P in B. We show that W = δ(P ). By definition, W satisfies the
equalityW =
⋃
i≥0 φ(P,W, i). ClearlyW 6= P , since
P : [P ]
[P ]
is one of the default
4 Note that cautious monotony may still hold in the case of multiple extensions. In
fact, the nonmonotonic consequence relations determined by precondition-free default
structures satisfy cautious monotony, as pointed out in [27].
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rules in ∆. But the first default rules applied must add tokens of the form [X ],
soW contains a token of the form [Q], with Q ⊆ P . Consistency requires further
that P ⊆ Q˜, since P ⊆W . By Lemma 5, Q ⊆ P and P ⊆ Q˜ implies Q˜ = P˜ .
Since [Q] ∈ W , all tokens of the form [R] with R˜ = P˜ are consistent with
W . Therefore, φ(P,W, 1) = P ∪ {[R] | R ⊆ P & R˜ = P˜}, which contains [Q], in
particular.
In the next iteration, all the default rules
{[R]} : c
c
with R ⊆ P and R˜ = P˜
get applied. In particular, all default rules
{[P ]} : a
a
with a ∈ P˜ \P get applied,
with the net effect of adding all members of P˜ in φ(P,W, 2). So, φ(P,W, 2) =
P˜ ∪ {[R] | R ⊆ P & R˜ = P˜}.
Different from the case for Theorem 5, we have not yet reached a fixed-
point in the second iteration. Additional default rules of the form
R : [R]
[R]
may
be applicable, with R˜ = P˜ and R ⊆ P˜ (note the relaxed condition here). This
shows φ(P,W, 3) = δ(P ), and there is no additional applicable default rules from
now on.
✷
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